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Repeated Game Simulator

Cooperation, punishment, and the shadow of the future

Run the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with classic strategies — tit-for-tat, grim trigger, win-stay lose-shift. Adjust payoffs and discount factors to find when cooperation becomes sustainable.

δ∗=T−RT−P=5−35−1=0.500\delta^* = \frac{T - R}{T - P} = \frac{5-3}{5-1} = 0.500(cooperation sustainable)
Player 1 Tit-for-Tat
Cooperation rate: 2.0%
Avg discounted payoff: 0.95
Player 2 Always Defect
Cooperation rate: 0.0%
Avg discounted payoff: 1.22
P1
P2
Colored = CooperateDark = Defect
Player 1Player 2
5101520253035404550round01020304050cumulative payoff

Adjust strategies and payoffs to explore how cooperation emerges in repeated interactions. The critical discount factor determines whether grim-trigger cooperation is sustainable.

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Repeated Game Simulator — Game Theory Labs · hbar.university